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Abstract. Cybersecurity tools are increasingly automated with artificial 
intelligent (AI) capabilities to match the exponential scale of attacks, compensate 
for the relatively slower rate of training new cybersecurity talents, and improve 
of the accuracy and performance of both tools and users. However, the safe and 
appropriate usage of autonomous cyber attack tools – especially at the 
development stages for these cyber attack tools – is still largely an unaddressed 
gap. Our survey of current literature and tools showed that most of the existing 
cyber range designs are mostly using manual tools and have not considered 
augmenting automated tools or the potential security issues caused by the tools. 
In other words, there is still room for a novel cyber range design which allow 
security researchers to safely deploy autonomous tools and perform automated 
tool testing if needed. In this paper, we introduce Pandora, a safe testing 
environment which allows security researchers and cyber range users to perform 
experiments on automated cyber attack tools that may have strong potential of 
usage and at the same time, a strong potential for risks. Unlike existing testbeds 
and cyber ranges which have direct compatibility with enterprise computer 
systems and the potential for risk propagation across the enterprise network, our 
test system is intentionally designed to be incompatible with enterprise real-
world computing systems to reduce the risk of attack propagation into actual 
infrastructure. Our design also provides a tool to convert in-development 
automated cyber attack tools into to executable test binaries for validation and 
usage realistic enterprise system environments if required. Our experiments 
tested automated attack tools on our proposed system to validate the usability of 
our proposed environment. Our experiments also proved the safety of our 
environment by compatibility testing using simple malicious code.  
Keywords: Cyber autonomy, cybersecurity, cyber range, cyber tool 
automation, binary exploitation 
1 Introduction 
The increasing rate and global nature [1] of cyber attacks and the recent trends towards 
cyber autonomy [2] have resulted in questions about the scalability of current 
cybersecurity approaches and the relatively-long time required to train cyber 
professionals in comparison to the emergence of new cyber threats [3]. In an attempt to 
overcome this asymmetric attack and response rates, we are witnessing an increasing 
demand for cyber autonomy from the cyber-security industry. There is also an inability 
to train cybersecurity professionals quick enough to be able to address the increasing 
rate of cyber threats. 
Donevski and Zia [4] stated that the current lack of cybersecurity professionals is 
one of the reasons the cybersecurity industry has struggled in addressing this scale 
problem. This is also widely termed as the ‘cyber skills gap’. According to Smith [5], 
while it is a good effort, re-education may not a practical solution, as the rate of cyber 
threats is accelerating too fast for existing professionals to handle – overwhelming 
many cybersecurity professionals in the process. An augmentation of automation tools 
to automate most tasks while freeing up time and resources for cybersecurity 
professionals to make decisions aided by cyber automation promises to meet the 
exponentially-growing demands for cybersecurity, risk assessments and compliance 
[6]. Cyber autonomy also allows the cybersecurity industry address scale and new 
security issues introduced by cloud computing [7-9] and other emerging technologies.  
Besides addressing the cyber skills gap and the accelerating rate of cyber threats, it 
is also important to be able to evaluate and test the usefulness of autonomous cyber 
attack tools often used in increasingly-automated red-teaming environments or security 
assessments. Having a technique or platform to test these cyber autonomy tools will 
facilitate more effective tool evaluation, especially before they are actually deployed 
into actual enterprise environment. Researchers have also found automated tools with 
AI algorithms to be cost effective solutions [10]. Furthermore, a diverse set of test areas 
for system hardening could be conducted by automated tools such as detecting SQL 
injection vulnerabilities [11], penetrating testing [12], man-in-the-middle attacks[13] 
and finding exploitable bugs in binaries [14]. 
Despite the usefulness of automated cyber attack tools, prototyped versions of the 
tools in their initial stages of development could cause unexpected results. Kaloudi and 
Li’s survey paper [15] and the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC) [16] described 
and demonstrated fully-automated AI-based automated attacks could evade detection 
measures respectively. The risks around deploying these tools before proper testing are 
evident. Without first testing within a proper testing environment, a prototyped 
automated attack tool may cause critical damage on real-world infrastructures. In fact, 
a prominent example is the Morris worm in 1988 [17], which was initially created to 
understand the size of the Internet at that time, but unintentionally rendered about 10% 
of the systems on the Internet unusable. 
Despite possible threats caused by the unintended situations, the automation of 
exploitation tools is a popular topic for cybersecurity researchers. Web-based attack 
tools such as vulnerability scanning [1, 18], SQL Injection [11, 19] and Cross-Site 
Scripting [19] are the most commonly seen topics for network automation tools. 
Consequently, testing environments for network-based tools are commonly proposed. 
In the case of binary exploitations, at the time of writing, there are few existing 
testing environments that are designed for automated binary exploit tools. Researchers 
usually utilize virtualization technologies to create test environments for binary 
experiments. However, this does not guarantee a safe environment. For example, 
vulnerabilities such as Venom [20] (CVE-2015-3456) and VMware Fusion’s 
vulnerability (VMSA-2015-0004) (CVE-2015-2337) [21] allow malicious code to 
penetrate the barrier between VMs and Host, thereby causing damage to host systems.  
Even with proper security measurements, some attack tools, especially automated 
tools with advanced technologies such as machine learning could be unpredictable [22]. 
Conversely, machine learning techniques could also help malware avoid detection. 
There is also no guarantee with regards to the outputs generated during the testing – 
putting the host system in increased risks. Therefore, a secure testing environment is 
required to prevent unpredictable propagation of risks into connected enterprise 
environments – achieving the true requirements of a ‘sandboxed’ environment. 
To mitigate the above gaps and provide a solution for cyber ranges and test 
environments, we propose Pandora, a secure cyber range design for automated 
cybersecurity tools testing. The proposed design allows automated testing of any types 
of exploits without threatening the real-world infrastructures linked to the cyber range. 
Our approach also caters to the requirements of deployment fully-automated tools 
within the cyber range – preparing the users for an increasingly autonomous cyber 
environment.  
In order to prove the functionality of the proposed cyber range, a vulnerable binary 
in our cyber range has been successfully and automatically exploited by a binary exploit 
tool. This was formed via combining a number of known cybersecurity tools, to 
represent an automated attack. 
We carried out a comparison of simple malicious code in our suggested environment 
and a Linux Ubuntu 18.04 LTS Linux system to confirm the isolation of automated 
attack tools from real-world infrastructures connected to the cyber range. The code 
worked and achieved our goals within our isolated environment, but it does not work 
for any generic Linux system – proving the non-portability of the test from our 
environment to typical enterprise Linux environments. 
The main contributions of our research are: 
─ We propose a cyber range design to mitigate potential risks of automated 
cybersecurity tools in their early-stage development. The design could be 
implemented using common off-the-shelf tools. 
─ We verified the proper working of our implementation by executing an automated 
tool in our system. 
─ We confirm the isolation of the designed cyber range from real-world infrastructures 
– achieving non-propagation of potential unknown risks. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discuss the background and related work. 
We provide the design of our proposed cyber range in Section 3 and in Section 4, we 
discuss case studies including an overview of hardware systems and software used. 
Result analyses of case studies including verification for incompatibility of the 
implementation are discussed in Section 5. We then conclude and propose future work 
in Section 6. 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Background 
As described in [23], a cyber range is an environment that provides a realistic 
environment suitable for conducting ‘live fire’ type of exercises which train computer 
network operators for cyber defense, and support experimentation and testing via a 
combination of cybersecurity products. Typically, the architecture of a cyber range 
could be split into sub-components. For example, as shown in Figure 1, Yamin et al. 
[24] suggested eight components comprising a cyber range. As long as the setup is 
correct and there are no misuse of tools, a cyber range environment allows anyone who 
wishes to have cybersecurity-related experiential training in cyber attack and defense 
to train within an environment with no direct risks on actual computer systems. 
 
Considering the eight components of Figure 1, our research focuses on the 'Runtime 
Environment' which provides a safe test environment for cybersecurity researchers. The 
'Runtime Environment' component is composed of the 'Emulator', 'Simulator', 'Attack 
Generation', 'HW' (i.e. hardware), 'Traffic Generation', and 'Gen. User Behavior' 
subcomponents. However, the 'Traffic Generation' and 'Gen. User Behavior' are out of 
scope for this paper which focuses on demonstrating test environments for automated 
binary exploitation cyber attack tools.  
Fig. 1. Cyber range and security testbed functional architecture [1] 
In the case of the subcomponent 'HW', real physical hardware are required to provide 
computing power. Based on the 'HW', an 'Emulate' subcomponent could mimic an 
operating system to create a simulated test environment. To create a simulated victim 
system, vulnerable applications or disclosed common vulnerabilities and exposures 
(CVE[25]) could be set up on the emulated operating system. With the aforementioned 
subcomponents, an attack application automated will be tested as a subcomponent 
'Attack Generation' as shown in Figure 1. 
Unlike many existing works that focusing on virtualization or containerization of 
test environments[24, 26-29], we concentrate on the security and simplicity of the 
testing environment. The reason for that many designs are focused on virtualization 
technologies is to increase the realism of the testing environment, thus, helping 
researchers to learn in an environment that may simulate a certain situation during a 
cybersecurity incident –making the testing as realistic as possible. However, as 
mentioned in Section 1, virtualization may not guarantee a threat free environment for 
its test infrastructure since vulnerabilities such as Venom [20] and VMware Fusion’s 
vulnerability [21].  
2.2 Related Research 
While AI enhances the effectiveness of tools, it can also be used by malware. For 
example, Goosen [22] showed that, even with proper security measurements, some 
attack tools – especially automated tools with advanced technologies such as machine 
learning – could help malware avoid detection. On the other hand, we are seeing the 
emergence of other branches of AI, such as Amos-Binks’ usage of automated planning 
(which is concerned with the realization of strategies or action sequence based on goals 
and constraints) for execution by intelligent agents [30].  
In recent years, automated binary exploitation tools have emerged. One of the most 
prominent projects, Mayhem [14] by ForAllSecure has shown that it is possible to let 
a machine exploit binaries by itself using regular binary executables. While the current 
methods were not as good as human cybersecurity specialists with more creativity to 
invent new classes of attacks [2], the method has actually been realized into the 
computer, and computers generally spend less time examining binaries and are usually 
much more effective on a larger scale [2]. Some other automated approaches were able 
to search, discover, and patch vulnerabilities binaries. An example is the Cyber 
Reasoning System (CRS) Rubeus [31] by Raytheon during the DARPA CGC which 
uses machine learning and other AI technologies to help enhance its offensive abilities.  
Over time, cyber ranges have been designed for different purposes. For example, the 
DETER Project [32] is one of the most prominent and earliest projects, and was 
designed for scientific and cybersecurity purposes. One of the essential stand-out 
characteristics of the DETER project was how realistic it was in terms of mimicking 
actual IT infrastructures.  
Some other recent implementations are the cyber range for Cyber Defense Situation 
Awareness from Debatty and Mees [26], and the ones taking the approach for 
educational purposes such as the RC2F framework[27] and the SEED Lab [28]. A few 
other cyber range designs focus on increasing number of features and efficiency of 
challenge maintenance such as Yamin et al. [24], and the one by Frank et al. [29]. 
3 Proposed Framework 
The related work above has revealed opportunities for new cyber range designs to 
accommodate cyber autonomy safely and securely, and retain the comprehensiveness 
and usability such that new researchers or students who would like to test or create new 
cyber autonomy tools can safely test the early-stage deployment without any risk of 
propagating unpredictable results to a connected enterprise network.  
As such, one of the primary reasons for creating Pandora as a cyber range for 
automated tool testing is to contain the potential propagation of undesired outcomes of 
some automated tools. Therefore, our proposed framework should be able to help 
researchers test dangerous automated tools within a safe and secure environment, and 
also simple enough to work and analyze with. This means students and newcomers 
could also create their automated tools for small projects and experiments. 
3.1 Threat Modelling 
To encapsulate our framework’s resilience against common threats faced by current 
approaches listed above, we developed a threat model for analysis. Our threat model is 
based on security vulnerabilities related to virtualization and communication.  
3.1.1 Threat for Virtualization 
As [20, 21] demonstrated that the barrier to segregate a virtual machine from its host 
machine is unsafe, we shall assume that an automated attack tool could affect its host 
machine beyond the test environment. In the case of a highly realistic virtual 
environment, the damages from tested tools could be severe depending on the level of 
emulation. Our threat model focus on protecting realistically set-up infrastructures from 
unexpected attacks.  
3.1.2 Threat for Communication 
Vulnerabilities such as CVE-2018-10933 [33] demonstrated possibilities that might 
help the malicious clients get unauthorized access to other machines. In this 
vulnerability, the emulated network connection could be utilized as a path to allow a 
cybersecurity tool/weapon in development to access systems outside the testbed or 
cyber range. Other network security and communication vulnerabilities are already 
researched and hence, the protection of internal or external network for cyber range is 
out of scope for this paper. 
3.2 Framework Design 
With our attack models described, we now propose a design of a cyber range focused 
on the “run time environment” illustrated previously in Figure 1, for testing automated 
cyber attack tools based on the modeled threats. 
As shown in Figure 2, our proposed design could be divided into two main parts: 
‘Virtualized Cyber Range’ and ‘Generic Operating System’ and their subcomponents. 
A brief description about the design is described below and details such as code 
snippets of the specific implementation can be found later in Section 5. 
3.2.1 Virtualized Cyber Range 
Our proposed cyber range is designed to be installed within a virtual machine, which 
should have a secure operating system which has some level of incompatibility with 
any generic operating system. As discussed earlier, the intentional incompatibility is 
introduced to reduce risks of unpredicted propagation of damage caused by tools to 
environments outside the test operating system. A vulnerable binary manager will be 
running for managing all exploit and analysis work. 
─ Secure Operating System (Secure OS) 
One of the ways that keep the cyber range secure at the operating system level is to 
ensure that any newly compiled binary or malicious code within the cyber range is 
incompatible with any other regular computer system. A secure operating system 
should be used for this purpose; also, tools for compiling binaries should be provided. 
Since the environment focused on tool testing rather than real-machine simulation, one 
should keep all functions simple for researchers and newcomers to use. 
─ Vulnerable Binary Manager 
As shown in Figure 2, the purpose of the Vulnerable Binary Manager is to execute 
vulnerable binaries within the secure environment, and use input exploits against the 
Fig. 2. Proposed Cyber Range Design for Cyber Autonomy 
vulnerable binary and analyze the effect of exploitations. This will limit all exploit 
activities within the Secure OS – thus protecting the host machine. 
─ Vulnerable Binary 
A vulnerable binary is a file that contains purposefully designed vulnerabilities for 
automated tools to exploit. The complexity of the vulnerabilities should be simple and 
meaningful, which should be able to demonstrate one or more functions of the 
automated cybersecurity tool. The vulnerable binary should be able to execute within 
the Secure OS, but not in any generic operating system for our intended incompatibility 
purpose. 
3.2.2 Generic Operating System (Generic OS) 
Since automated cybersecurity could be conceptually developed for any platform, a 
generic operating system (Generic OS) can be selected as needed. In order to 
communicate with the cyber range, a vulnerability manager will be used for sending 
through exploits and receiving responses from the vulnerable binary manager. 
─ Vulnerability Manager 
The vulnerability manager is a module that could take input exploit, communicate with 
vulnerable binary manager to how to exploit a certain vulnerable binary. This module 
should be able to be embedded or provide application programming interfaces(API) to 
other automated cybersecurity tools for fully automated experiments. 
─ Automated Cybersecurity Tool 
Secure OS is incompatible with any Generic OS for security purpose, and may lack 
some critical data due to simplification, which could cause difficulty for cybersecurity 
tool development and less powerful, therefore, cybersecurity tools should be deployed 
within a Generic OS. This also allows the cybersecurity tool targeting the Secure OS to 
easily port or make modifications for other purposes. 
─ Vulnerable Binary 
Like the vulnerable binary in Secure OS, a vulnerable binary in the Generic OS is a file 
that contains purposefully designed vulnerabilities for automated tools to exploit. 
3.2.3 Sequence Diagram 
Figure 3 below describes how a user could interact with our proposed cyber range. 
Firstly, the users are required to setup up generic operating systems for both the 
virtualized cyber range and the environment for cyber attack tools. A virtual machine 
with a secure operating system should also be installed to the virtualized cyber range. 
Secondly, the user would start the vulnerable binary manager and vulnerability 
manager for the cyber attack tool to interact with the cyber range. The vulnerability 
manager could be embedded into cyber attack tool for easier managing. Thirdly, after 
the environmental setup, vulnerable binaries should be created, compiled and installed 
into the cyber range. Fourth, if a file-transfer function is not developed, vulnerable 
binaries should also be installed into the automated cyber attack tool for analyzing and 
exploiting. Finally, the user would use the automated cyber attack tool to exploit 
vulnerable binaries, generate exploits, then send exploits through the vulnerability 
manager to the cyber range for analyzing the effect of the exploit, and for collecting 
results. 
4 Case Study and Experiments  
In this section, we will describe our implementation and experiments based on the 
scope defined earlier.  
 
4.1 Framework Implementation 
We implemented the experiment using the following equipment:  
4.1.1 Experiment Computer Hardware Specification 
We intentionally implemented our experiments on a laptop to reduce the need for 
future researchers to procure specialized hardware. As such, we constrained our 
implementation around practical and commonly-accessible computing equipment to 
encourage reproducibility. As such, we implemented our experiment and recommend 
at least the following configuration:   
• CPU: 4 processor cores 
• Memory: 16 GB RAM 
• Operating System: Windows 10/MacOS X 10.x or higher/Linux(kernel 
4.0 or higher)  
 
Fig. 3. Sequence Diagram 
4.1.2 Virtual Machine Setting for Virtualized Cyber Range and Generic 
Operating System 
Similarly, we implemented the virtualizes cyber ranged and Generic OS in the 
following environment:  
• VMware Fusion 11.5.6 
• CPU: 2 processor cores 
• Memory: 8GB RAM 
4.1.3 Virtualized Cyber Range Implementation 
─ DECREE - Secure Operating System  
To fulfil the requirement of our proposed design, we used DECREE [34] created by 
DARPA for the CGC [16] as the base of the cyber range structure in the case studies. 
DECREE is a modified i386 Debian Wheezy with Linux kernel 3.13.2, with only seven 
modified system-calls and minimum non-determinism in system level [34]. As such, 
this increases the replayability of the system, which is highly useful for our research 
purpose.  
DECREE has a built-in custom-made compiler and correlated toolsets, which can be 
used to compile the C source code into a unique executable format called DECREE 
Binary, which makes the DECREE binaries incompatible with a generic operating 
system.  
For the case studies, a virtual-machines cluster developed by DARPA called virtual-
competition [35] will be used. It contains five pre-set virtual machines that represent 
each significant part of the competition but does not have any abilities to do 
analysis[36]. Software for the virtual-competition will not be used in this study. 
─ cb-server - Vulnerable Binary Manager 
cb-server [37] will be used as the vulnerable binary manager, which is responsible to 
take exploit inputs from the vulnerability manager, analyze the exploit and use it against 
the vulnerable binary within the cyber range. 
─ Vulnerable Binary 
Legit_00003[38] is a simple C program created by LegitBS during DEFCON 24 in 
2016. It was originally designed for human to human attack and defense CTF with CGC 
infrastructure. It contains a simple menu with three options. The function of 
legit_00003 is simply let the user input their name, print their name or exit. It has a 
basic stack overflow vulnerability which can be found with fuzzing or symbolic 
execution techniques. 
4.1.4 Generic Operating System (Generic OS) Implementation 
─ Operating System 
The operating system of choice for both case studies is the Ubuntu 18.04 LTS with 
4.15.0-76-generic kernel. 
─ Cb-Replay-Pov - Vulnerability Manager 
The program cb-replay-pov[37] will be used as the Vulnerability Manager, which is 
able to accept POV format file and communicate with the Vulnerable Binary Manager 
cb-server. 
─ Legit_00003 - Vulnerable Binary 
The same binary for Virtualized Cyber Range (see Section 4.1.3) has been used. In this 
implementation, the exploit process remains in a generic Linux OS that has an angr 
development environment [39] installed. The vulnerable binary needs to be copied into 
the host machine in order to generate exploit, which shows that the architecture design 
of the proposed testing environment is feasible. 
4.2 Implementation of Automated Cybersecurity Tool 
To simulate the automated attack tool, a combination of a fuzzing tool and an automated 
exploitation engine have used to represent an automated attack tool. To make the 
combination using two tools, we have programmed a script application. 
4.2.1 Fuzzing Tool - Phuzzer 
Phuzzer [40] is a Python wrapper for interacting with fuzzers created by the angr 
team; it has the American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) [41] as one of the core functions. Since the 
Cyber Grand Challenge considers a system crash as a vulnerability, this type of fuzzing 
methods for the simple program used in this case is an excellent choice. Therefore, in 
this case, Phuzzer is used to find the crash string from the vulnerable program. 
4.2.2 Automated Exploit Engine – rex  
rex[42] is an automated exploit engine created by the team Shellphish, from the 
University of California Santa Barbara. It is a tool designed to generate exploit for 
DECREE binary and simple Linux Binaries. In our case study, rex is used to exploit 
targeted vulnerable programs, using the relevant crash string from the fuzzing tool. 
Note that due to dependency issues, rex is recommended to executed within an angr 
development environment. 
4.2.3 Script for Exploit 
We wrote a script that combines phuzzer and rex to simulate the automated tool. The 
combined symbolic execution techniques and Phuzzer with AFL core are executed to 
find a string that could crash the legit_00003. After that, rex was executed to generate 
a Proof of Vulnerability (POV) (described in Section 4.3 later) format exploit. Figure 
4 shows the core part of the code. 
4.3 Case Study 1 – Automated Exploit 
To confirm the functions of our implemented design with DECREE and correlated-
infrastructure, we carried out an experiment for receiving and checking exploits input 
for both manual and automated methods. 
Since this case study builds on concepts from the DARPA CGC infrastructure, some 
information needs to be introduced in order to understand the procedures. For example, 
a Proof of Vulnerability (POV) is a type of XML or binary format file used to describe 
where is the vulnerabilities are and how to exploit the binary.  
There is no binary execution within the host OS, nor any direct modification of the 
vulnerable binary. The POV data will be sent through Vulnerability Manager and 
received by Vulnerable Binary Manager inside of Virtualized Cyber Range. A faulty 
POV will result in Vulnerable Binary Manager return incorrect response, thus causing 
experiment failure. 
4.3.1 Assumptions for Automated Exploit 
For the purpose of our experiments and for this research, we made a few assumptions: 
─ Since the goal of the study is to understand that if the designed framework works for 
automated attacks, we will not focus on the actual effects of the attacks. 
─ The focus of this study is to understand if the infrastructure functioned as intended. 
Hence, the actual contents of the POV will not be discussed.  
─ Manual attack processes will use pre-written C-format exploit created by the Legitbs 
which came along with the legit_00003 program. 
─ For our experiments, we assume that the vulnerability is known, so no vulnerability 
discovery processes will be made other than a simple fuzzing process. 
4.3.2 Testing Procedures 
─ Running Vulnerable Binary Manager 
Fig. 3. Script for Automated Exploit an POV generation 
The application cb-server will be running in Secure OS as the Vulnerable Binary 
Manager, waiting for input to exploit Vulnerable Binary.  
─ Exploit Generation  
The provided exploit which came with legit_00003 will be used as a reference since it 
has been tested before and proved to be effective. In this study, this POV will be 
compiled and send to the Secure OS virtual machine with Vulnerable Binary Manager 
as a controlled group. The source code of legit_00003 and its C format POV can be 
found at [38]. The automated tool will generate a POV which represents an automated 
cybersecurity tool, subsequently uploaded to the Vulnerable Binary Manager, and the 
result will then be used for comparison. 
─ Exploit Vulnerable Binary 
During the process, data will be sent by the Generic OS virtual machine, through the 
program Vulnerability Manager. The host machine has no direct connection to the VM 
that is executing the binary file with SSH. On the Secure Operating System side, 
Vulnerable Binary Manager will handle the exploit and analyze the input.  
4.4 Case Study 2 – Incompatibility of the DECREE System  
In our second experiment, we aim to demonstrate the advantage and usefulness of 
isolating the virtualized cyber range by making the Virtualized Cyber Range 
environment incompatible with Generic OS. A simple application with an indefinite 
loop to represent a simple ‘malware’ was executed in our Virtualized Cyber Range and 
a Linux machine for comparing the test results.  
To program the simple malware for our experiment, we used an uncompiled version 
of legit_00003 as the template. In order to make sure that there is no influence from 
legit_00003, all unnecessary files and DECREE system calls were removed. Figure 5 
shows the source code of the simple application tested. As shown in the source code, it 
the program will indefinitely print out an integer with an increment of 1. Note that the 
header file ‘printf.h’ is from the package that came with the legit_00003, and a 
minimum version of ‘printf’ statement. 
5 Result and Analysis 
5.1 Case Study 1 – Result 
In Case Study 1, we carried out exploiting Vulnerable Binary using an implemented 
automated cybersecurity tool to validate our implementation. The result of ‘pov_1.pov’ 
is the given POV from the legit_00003 creator, and the other one is the output from the 
automated attack tool. The provided POV from the legit_00003 creator was used as a 
reference to check the exploitation result of our attack tool.  
There are two types of POVs[43]}:  
- Type 1 POV requires to demonstrate control of instructor pointer and one of the 
additional for the vulnerable binary within DECREE, which apply to this case. 
- Type 2 POV requires to read the contents of arbitrary memory location. 
Figure 6 shows the result of both POVs, which consists of the following values.  
─ type 1 masks 
• According to the documentation of POV [43], the combination of the IP mask 
and Register Mask form the exploitation output to Type 1 mask. IP mask and 
Register Mask are required values for the Vulnerable Binary Manager to exploit 
a vulnerable binary in DECREE. Based on the delivered IP mask value and 
Register Mask value, the attack point of vulnerable binary will be pointed out. 
─ type 1 pov: 
• Type 1 pov shows the IP value and Register value that can be used to exploit the 
target vulnerable DECREE binary. The successful obtaining of the type 1 pov 
value will allow the POV to assert that it can control the instruction pointer and 
eight general-purpose registers [43]. The instruction pointer is a kind of memory 
pointer for an executable file and the eight general-purpose registers are designed 
registers for DECREE to exploit binary files compiled for DECREE system. 
However, since the CGC infrastructure was not fully open-sourced, we are unable 
to analyze the value. That said, checking the acceptability of the framework 
design can be done sufficiently by comparing the generated data from our attack 
and the provided data from vulnerable binary designer.  
• The last digit of the type 1 pov value indicates which one out of eight valid 
general-purpose registers contains the required value [43]. Since the automated 
Fig. 5. ‘Malware’ Source Code 
Fig. 6. Result of both types of POVs 
script received produced the same register as the provided one, it can be inferred 
and concluded that the value is correct. 
5.2 Case Study 1 – Analysis 
The functionality of our proposed design is our main focus for Experiment 1, which 
can be divided into two points: (1) communication and binary execution in two different 
environments with different executable formats, and (2) the performance of automated 
tool in such a special environment. 
In this case study, the vulnerable binary manager cb-server is running within the 
secure operating system to handle the binary execution and exploit input. At the same 
time, the vulnerability manager is within a generic operating system that communicates 
with the vulnerable binary manager through the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). 
This shows that, as long as a proper manager service is within each of the operating 
system, standard networking protocols could also make isolating the cyber range in the 
operating system level possible.  
For the performance of automated tool, legit_00003, the vulnerable binary has a 
simple buffer overflow vulnerability leveraging the buffer size issue. The buffer 
overflow vulnerability enables attackers to take control of the computer system if they 
could control memory pointer to access some malicious code programmed by them. 
This type of buffer overflow attack is typical of many attacks experienced in the real-
world today. The example POV contains a hard-coded input to fill out the buffer, and 
uses some techniques to exploit the target binary. Figure 7 shows the actual payload 
that exploits the legit_00003 from the POV provided.  
Recalling Figure 6, it was shown that generated POVs by the automated attack tool 
were similar and provided POV except the value of ‘type 1 pov’ since they are 
representing specific memory addresses of the vulnerable binary, which should be 
different every time. Also, considering the ‘cb-replay-pov’ and ‘cb-server’ acceptance 
mechanism that only accept right POV report, we can confirm that the exploit generated 
by automated script works very similar to manually exploit provided. Thus, the 
performance of automated tools in the proposed environment works as intended. 
5.3 Case Study 2 – Result 
Figure 8 shows the shell output of the programmed simple ‘malware’ in the 
Virtualized Cyber Range virtual machine. As it was intended, the malware prints 
infinitely numbers of integers start from 1 with an increment of 1. 
Fig. 7. Payload from provided POV 
To compare its execution result, the ‘malware’ was copied to two different Linux 
distributions (Ubuntu 18.04 and Debian 4.19.132-1). As shown in Figure 9, both 
operating systems failed to execute the sample malware with the same output. 
5.4 Case Study 2 – Analysis 
In Case Study 2, a sample ‘malware’ was successfully compiled into the DECREE 
binary format. As Figure 8 has shown, the ‘malware’ can be successfully executed 
within DECREE but, as expected, cannot be executed within a generic Linux system 
as showed in Figure 9.  
The failure of executing the malware created for DECREE system in the generic 
operating system verified the program incompatibility between DECREE system and 
tested generic OS. This incompatibility confirms that automated cyber attack tools 
compiled for proposed cyber range are not able to propagate on to real-world computing 
systems linked to the cyber range in a corporate network (e.g. a Local Area Network 
(LAN)). The success of this case study also shows that the concept of using different 
operating systems in cyber range could provide a reasonable level of security while 
keeping the functionality of the cyber range. We acknowledge that there is also 
potential for further research to be conducted to verifying the security of our experiment 
through other techniques, such as formal verification.  
Even though the process for creating the ‘malware’ was very simple with a 
vulnerable binary template, it was representative as the compile processes are very 
similar to the ‘make’ process of any generic C program. In order to create a DECREE 
binary without a template, a number of special modules are required as described in 
Figure 10.  
Although it is possible to extract all tools and related modules from DECREE to 
create an individual compiling script, the vulnerable binary template is still our 
preference because of its convenience. This also applies to other secure operating 
systems with the same type of incompatibility design. It is worth noting that a 
cybersecurity tool may be required to do multiple compilations or script generation 
over time, which may result in serious performance degradation due to the constant 
Fig. 8. Shell output of the sample malware 
Fig. 9. Shell output of the sample malware in a generic Linux System 
access of the secure operating system. In such a situation, the tool should be developed 
in a generic operating system with all the required packages integrated. 
6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work 
We proposed Pandora, a simple and secure cyber range framework to allow 
cybersecurity researchers to perform automated tool testing during the development 
process within a truly sandboxed environment. Our proposed design focus on the 
isolation of the test environments from real-world systems in order to address risk and 
malware propagation concerns for security testing of automated cyber attack tools. This 
addresses one of the development and testing needs of cyber autonomy, an emerging 
and popular cybersecurity research topic.  
Our approach leverages developed open sourced software packages used during the 
DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge to segregate the secure experiment system from host 
infrastructure and to provide a communication channel between the safe system and 
generic system. 
We demonstrated successful test activities of an autonomous hacking application 
and compared malicious program execution results on our secure system against 
prevalent systems. Our two experiments demonstrated that our design achieved 
automated binary exploitations while making sure that a compiled program for the 
secure system in the range is not executable in generic system outside the range. 
For future work, as our current version works only in the Intel i386 architecture, we 
aim to extend the secure operating system’s hardware compatibility – a requirement for 
expanding feasible test infrastructures. The improvement of automation for the secure 
cyber range is another requirement to enable increased machine learning model 
training. The implementation of secure, real-time file transfer function for Vulnerable 
Fig. 10. Packages required for compiling the sample malware  
Binary Manager and Vulnerability Manager would be a critical step towards achieving 
fully automated cyber range. 
Our work also has potential from an educational viewpoint. Since the cyber range 
works similar to a server that could take and evaluate exploit input, it might be possible 
to form a capture-the-flag (CTF) styled training or red-blue team training based on 
Pandora’s design. The server for CTF training should be fully automated with a 
dynamic scoring system for tracking and analyzing the performance of the trainees. 
Finally, for students and newcomers with little experience working on security 
measures such as Address Space Layout Randomization and Structured Exception 
Handling Overwrite Protection [44], Pandora could enable trainees to train in a simple, 
security-oriented environments like DECREE, reducing configuration needs and 
freeing up time for actual training. 
7 Access to Code and Artifacts  
Our work builds on the work of many other open source projects and it continues 
beyond the time of publication. It is our intention to continue the open source nature 
of the project. All code created for this paper can be found in the following 
repository: https://cyber.uq.edu.au/repos/pandora-cyber-range    
Other accompanying code and environments such as the angr development 
environment and legit_00003 can be found in the original authors’ repositories. 
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